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In this article, justifications by producers (economic protectionism), consumers and 
social advocates (humanitarian motives) for including labour standards in international 
trade agreements are discussed. To date, little work has been undertaken to determine 
empirically whether low labour standards lead to trade distortions. This article provides 
some empirical evidence pertaining to this question. Consumer groups, social 
advocates and traditional vested interests such as labour unions have attempted to have 
labour standards included in WTO disciplines. In the absence of success at the WTO, 
the relationship between labour standards and international trade has, however, been 
evolving in the areas of private standards and preferential trade agreements. Given the 
leading role that preferential trade agreements sometimes take in establishing future 
directions in multilateral trade agreements and the increasing dissatisfaction with the 
WTO’s treatment of consumer issues in general, in the future labour standards may 
well work their way into multilateral trade agreements. The empirical results show that 
low labour standards could potentially lead to trade distortions, but more empirical 
work is required before a legitimate case might be made to have labour standards 
considered in multilateral trade negotiations. 
Keywords: consumers, food processing, labour standards, preferential trade 
agreements, trade distortion  
The Estey Centre Journal of
International Law 
and Trade Policy   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    154
Introduction  
t the time the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was negotiated 
in the mid-1940s, the framers of the agreement did not expect that consumers 
would be requesting that their governments put barriers to market access in place. The 
simple economic model that underlies the tariff-reducing objective of the GATT 
suggested that if tariffs were removed, prices in an importing country would fall, 
which would benefit consumers but would be detrimental for producers (Gaisford and 
Kerr, 2001). Similarly, if the relative international competitiveness of import-
competing industries deteriorated, meaning stronger competition from imports, 
consumers would benefit – and thus would have no incentive to ask for measures that 
limited market access for imports. Of course, producers facing fiercer competition 
from imports could be expected to seek protection from policy makers. It was 
recognized in the GATT that policy makers may feel inclined to extend protection to 
producers in certain instances.  
The potential for governments to grant protection, however, considerably 
increases the risks of engaging in international transactions for exporters (Kerr and 
Perdikis, 2003). This increase in risk inhibits investment in exporting activities and 
lowers the benefits that can be expected from trade. Hence, firms that wish to engage 
in international trade activities lobby for stronger rules – where stronger means that 
the ability of political decision makers to impose policies that disrupt trade is 
constrained. Given that the imposition of policies that distort trade can be viewed, 
from an international relations perspective, as a non-cooperative game (Gaisford and 
Kerr, 2003), trade agreements represent cooperative attempts to limit the economic 
cost of granting protection. Thus, at any point in time trade agreements represent the 
existing balance between the desire of decision makers to have the prerogative to 
extend protection for domestic political reasons and the desire of firms wishing to 
invest in international commercial activities for those prerogatives to be constrained. 
Given that only producers were expected to ask for protection when the GATT 
was negotiated, the entire edifice was structured so that it recognized the reality of the 
political need, at times, to extend protection to producers – it could not be done away 
with. Existing levels of protection were grandfathered, but the ability to extend or 
expand their use was limited to a considerable degree. For example, no new tariffs 
could be created and existing tariffs were bound. It was also agreed that other trade-
distorting measures such as subsidies were to be constrained. In the GATT, new 
rounds of negotiations could be agreed periodically. The objectives of these rounds of 
negotiations would be to erode existing levels of protection and to put in place 
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constraints on the granting of new forms of protection. If a country could not live up 
to its GATT commitments for political reasons, it was allowed to ignore them, but not 
without a cost: either compensation must be paid or the member state not receiving 
the expected benefit is allowed to retaliate.  
Relative international competitiveness is determined by a number of factors – 
labour cost being only one of them. Given that the production of some goods employs 
labour-intensive technologies, low-wage countries may enjoy a competitive advantage 
over the production of labour-intensive goods in high-wage countries (Perdikis and 
Kerr, 1998). As markets globalize, labour-intensive production is increasingly 
concentrated in developing countries. Labour-intensive manufacturing industries, such 
as textiles and clothing, have been heavily protected in developed countries. For 
example, until the Uruguay Round agreement, the textiles and clothing industries of 
developed countries were protected under various multi-fibre agreements that 
provided a greater degree of protection than the general GATT most-favoured-nation 
tariffs. The combination of low labour costs in developing countries combined with 
climate-based agronomic advantages was often used to justify high levels of 
protection for agricultural products in developed countries. 
While protection against low-wage producers was first grandfathered in the GATT 
and then, in certain cases, allowed to increase, differences in labour policies were not 
allowed to become justifications for the imposition of trade barriers. For example, if 
an importing country were to choose to raise its minimum wage, this could not be 
used as a reason to garner additional protection. Just as higher taxes are taken to be 
domestic choices that reflect a country’s level of development, so too are higher 
minimum wages. This does not mean, however, that those faced with paying higher 
minimum wages will not seek protection. Protectionists have been adept at 
manipulating information (Kerr and Foregrave, 2002) and seeking out allies in 
attempts to have their vested interests identified with the general good.  
Labour unions, in developed countries in particular, have argued that a broad 
range of labour standards can be trade distorting if their levels or the rigour with 
which they are enforced differs among countries. Lower or poorly enforced labour 
standards, they argue, can endow a country with an “unfair” international competitive 
advantage. The argument is often made that labour standards and their poor 
enforcement in developing countries are the cause of job losses in developed 
countries. Given that labour standards also have “human rights” attributes, it is 
sometimes argued that imposing trade barriers against goods produced in situations of 
low labour standards will provide an impetus for exporting countries to raise and/or 
better enforce their labour standards.
1 Hence, requests for protection can be identified   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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with generally accepted humanitarian objectives that can be classified as being within 
the notion of the general good. No matter what the rationale for the imposition of 
trade barriers, however, they will still provide an economic benefit to those who faced 
competition from imports. Thus, it is not possible to divorce the economic benefit 
received by vested interests – say members of labour unions in developed countries – 
from other justifications. This creates suspicion regarding the true motives of those 
advocating protection on humanitarian grounds. 
Given the inherent question of vested interests that arises regarding protection 
being granted on the basis of labour standards and the virulent resistance to labour 
standards being used as a justification for trade barriers, those negotiating the GATT 
(and subsequently the World Trade Organization) managed to keep the issue of labour 
standards off the multilateral negotiating agenda. Instead, the question of labour 
standards was put under the jurisdiction of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), where it is dealt with as a human rights issue rather than an international trade 
issue. A number of labour standards conventions have been negotiated under the 
auspices of the ILO. The ILO, however, has no sanctioning power (such as the 
imposition of barriers to market access). The only labour provision in the WTO is 
GATT Article XX (g) which provides an exception that allows trade restrictions to be 
put in place in the case of the products of prison labour. 
At the multilateral level, this neutralizing of the issue of labour standards by 
jurisdictional exclusion has been maintained, but in recent years the traditional vested 
interests that would have labour standards included as a justification for the 
imposition of trade restrictions have gained powerful allies in the form of consumers 
and social advocates. 
One objective of this article is to discuss the legitimacy of justifications for 
including labour standards in international trade agreements from producers’ 
(protectionism aspect), consumers’ and social advocates’ (humanitarian aspect) points 
of view. Including labour standards in any new trade negotiation agenda is not 
acceptable unless it can be shown that low labour standards lead to trade distortions. 
Hence, this article also attempts to address empirically whether developing countries 
can enhance their comparative advantage (especially in unskilled labour–intensive 
goods) through the use of low labour standards. The structure of this article is as 
follows: In the next two sections, consumer and social advocacy groups’ concerns 
regarding labour practices that are applied in the production of imported products are 
dealt with; the responses to these concerns in the form of imposing private standards 
in international supply chains and introducing provisions for labour standards in 
preferential trade agreements are then presented. After a brief presentation of the   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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theoretical framework, an empirical test of the influence of labour standards on 
exports of labour-intensive goods is reported. Conclusions and a summary of major 
results are presented in the final section. 
Consumers and Labour Standards 
As suggested above, the framers of the GATT/WTO did not anticipate that consumers 
would ask for protection and, hence, made no provision for governments to acquiesce 
to such demands (Kerr, 2004). There are, however, many recent examples where 
requests for trade protection have come from consumers, environmentalists and other 
interested parties that cannot be considered traditional, producer-based vested 
interests. Labour standards are only one of a range of issues that have sufficiently 
vexed consumers in recent years that they have sought the imposition of trade barriers. 
In some cases, the desire of consumers for protection has led to conflicts with the 
WTO rules and questioning of the appropriate role for the WTO. For example, some 
consumers in the European Union have been advocating an import ban on seal pelts 
from Canada and have persuaded the European Parliament to legislate limits on 
imports. Consumers and environmentalists in the United States asked for a ban on 
both imports of tuna caught in dolphin unfriendly ways and shrimp caught in turtle 
unfriendly ways (Isaac, Phillipson and Kerr, 2002). Consumers in the EU were 
successful in banning imports of beef produced using growth hormones – and in 
having the EU Commission accept retaliation rather than comply with a WTO dispute 
panel ruling (Kerr and Hobbs, 2005). This choice to accept retaliation rather than 
comply, while certainly within the EU’s rights under the WTO, is an unprecedented 
action. Environmentalists and some consumers in the EU have been vociferous in 
their opposition to imports of agricultural products produced using modern 
biotechnology – genetic modification (Isaac and Kerr, 2007). Consumers in many 
developed countries demanded broadly based restrictions on imports from China in 
the wake of media reports of a spate of product safety problems in 2007 (Liu, Kerr 
and Hobbs, 2009). Green labelling, leg-hold traps, organic standards, animal welfare 
and a wide range of other issues have also led to calls for restrictions on imports. As 
the WTO does not make provision for any group other than producers asking their 
governments for protection, these issues have not been satisfactorily resolved and, 
thus, the groups involved feel marginalized and frustrated, and the reputation of 
international trade institutions has plummeted within civil society. 
Consumers have also expressed considerable concerns regarding the labour 
practices that are applied in the production and manufacture of imported products. 
One of the most prominent cases involved sports manufacturer Nike. It was accused   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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of using child labour in the manufacture of soccer balls in Pakistan in 1996. Its 
operations in Cambodia were also associated with child labour in the 1990s. Such 
high profile cases have raised awareness among consumers and have led to a range of 
responses, from direct action such as boycotts of products/firms, to labelling 
initiatives, attempts to influence firms to develop private standards that are enforced 
for products entering their supply chains, and lobbying for the inclusion of labour 
standards in trade agreements. A range of labour standards–advocacy NGOs have 
arisen in the wake of rising consumer concerns and, in turn, act to raise awareness of 
labour standards issues relating to imports. Examples include the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center, the Ethical Trading Initiative, the Clean Clothes 
Campaign, Oxfam’s Clothes Code Campaign, Free the Children and Human Rights 
Watch. 
Social Advocacy and the Application of Trade 
Sanctions  
It is important to distinguish between social advocacy and consumers’ right to know. 
In reality, the two motivations are often hard to separate and may be embodied in the 
same individuals. They are, however, very different in the types of trade policy 
instruments that are advocated. In the case of consumers’ right to know, what is being 
sought is sufficient information so that the consumer can choose not to consume a 
product that was produced in ways he/she considers unacceptable. For example, a 
consumer may wish to forgo consumption of a product where child labour was used in 
its production. In this case, the appropriate trade barriers relate to labelling and 
supply-chain tracing – which can act as significant barriers to trade (Hobbs and Kerr, 
2006). Labelling has been a contentious issue at the WTO. In the WTO’s Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), a compromise was reached whereby labelling 
can be applied when a product is not like another product based on a discernible 
physical change in the final product, but not on the basis of the production process. 
The latter is known as production and processing methods (PPMs). Developing 
countries perceive any attempt to justify trade restrictions on the basis of PPMs as the 
thin edge of the wedge which would allow developed countries to put trade barriers in 
place based on the technology used in production (e.g., labour-intensive technologies) 
(Isaac, Phillipson and Kerr, 2002). 
Social advocates, in contrast, want labour standards in developing countries to 
improve. The motivation is altruistic and, typically, preferences are strongly held. As 
the ILO has no sanctioning power, social advocates often see trade agreements a 
means to effect change in foreign countries. The threat (or use) of trade restrictions is 
seen as a mechanism to provide an incentive for change among uncooperative   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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governments. Social advocacy groups in civil society see trade agreements (and 
organizations) as open to capture. Environmental groups have had some success in 
capturing international organizations (Kerr, 2001; Gordon, Hannesson and Kerr, 2001; 
Holtby, Kerr and Hobbs, 2007), and the case can certainly be made that the inclusion 
of protection for foreign intellectual property in the WTO through the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) represents the capture of a 
trade organization by those who have a vested interest in intellectual property (Kerr, 
2007). In particular, the way the WTO is structured, with a common dispute 
settlement mechanism and institutionalized cross-agreement retaliation, suggests that 
the sanctioning power of the GATT was a major motive for having the TRIPS 
agreement included in the WTO. Cross-agreement retaliation allows GATT-authorised 
trade restrictions to be imposed if a country fails to live up to its TRIPS commitments. 
While the efficacy of trade sanctions in altering the behaviour of governments is far 
from assured (Kerr and Gaisford, 1994), this has not diminished the enthusiasm of 
social advocates for co-opting the sanctioning power of trade restrictions. 
Sanctioning trade restrictions, in contrast to those based on the consumers’ right to 
know, tend to be punitive – tariffs, duties and import prohibitions. Of course, these 
types of trade restrictions tend to be associated with economic protectionism. 
As a result of both consumers’ right to know and social advocacy, there have been 
attempts to have labour standards issues put on the multilateral trade agenda. For 
example, in the run up to the 1999 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, the Clinton 
Administration tried to have labour standards included in future negotiations. Of 
course, developing countries strenuously objected and, at least in part, the failure of 
the 1999 Ministerial Meeting can be attributed to the conflict over this issue. Since 
then, the relationship between labour standards and international trade has been 
evolving in the areas of private standards and preferential trade agreements. In many 
cases, consumer groups, social advocates and traditional vested interests such as 
labour unions have joined forces to push the labour standards issue in the international 
trade arena. 
Private Standards in International Supply Chains 
In response to rising consumer concerns, Levi Strauss developed the first corporate 
code of conduct for labour standards in firms where orders were outsourced – its 
Global Sourcing and Operating Guidelines. By the end of the 1990s, the majority of 
manufacturers of apparel and major retailers had put in place codes targeted at labour 
practices in firms that wished to put products into their supply chains. According to 
Freeman (1998),   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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In most cases the codes are a corporate response to consumer concerns and 
activist pressures about labour standards. Widely publicized reports of 
poor labour conditions in source factories and accompanying bad publicity 
led Wal-Mart, The Gap, Liz Claiborne, Nike, JC Penney, Talbots, 
Starbucks and other major firms to adopt codes. Given the millions of 
dollars spent on advertising brand names, the risk of having any particular 
brand “become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime, and 
arbitrary abuse” made it good business practice to take defensive action … 
(p. 17) 
Over time, these private labour standards arrangements have become more 
stringent, detailed and prescriptive – for example, requiring that toilet paper be made 
available for textile workers in India (Khorana et al., 2010). 
Beyond textiles and clothing, agricultural labour practices in developing countries 
have been the subject of major corporate standards initiatives. Many are very detailed, 
leaving little to chance. Monitoring is a central element – due to early criticisms that 
the standards were little more than a public relations exercise unless they were 
effectively enforced. Of course, these private standards have come under criticism 
from a trade perspective because of their inherently discriminatory nature. The 
manifestation of the discrimination is, of course, different from the normal WTO 
concern relating to discrimination among countries; in the case of private standards 
the discrimination arises because some producers – often the poorest in developing 
countries – are prevented from accessing international supply chains if they cannot 
meet the prescribed standard. 
Private standards are often extremely detailed. For example, Starbucks Coffee’s 
Farmer Equity (C.A.F.E.) scheme lists approximately 75 criteria or indicators that can 
be seen as labour standards, grouped under headings such as (1) wages and benefits; 
(2) freedom of association and collective bargaining; (3) hours of work; (4) child 
labour/non-discrimination/forced labour; (5) access to housing, potable water and 
sanitary facilities; (6) access to medical care; and (7) worker safety and training 
(Starbucks Coffee Company, n.d.). Some of these categories reflect those adopted in 
ILO agreements,
2 while others extend beyond formal international commitments. A 
selection of the specific requirements and indicators embodied in C.A.F.E. illustrates 
the degree of detail that the standards entail: 
 
•  Full-time workers are paid at least a living wage as defined by a 
governmental or non-governmental labour/social rights organization. 
(If such data do not exist or the government defines minimum wage, 
the cost-of-living will be established by measuring the average cost of 
food, shelter, transportation, health care, clothing, energy and   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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education, in accordance with the formula generated by the 1998 
International NGO Living Wage Summit.) SR-HP1.14 
•  Financial disciplinary penalties are not assessed against workers. SR-
HP1.19 
•  CRITERIA REQUIREMENT: Workers can air workplace grievances 
to management or employer with no fear of reprisal. SR-HP2.2 
•  Hours worked on potentially hazardous activities (e.g., pesticide 
application, very heavy labour) are restricted in accordance with the 
law. In regions where such laws are not established such activities are 
limited to six hours per day. SR-HP3.4 
•  ZERO TOLERANCE: Employer does not directly contract any 
persons under the age of 14. (We prefer that our suppliers hire no one 
under the age of 15.) SR-HP4.1 
•  ZERO TOLERANCE: Management has an enforced policy 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, age 
or religion as per ILO Convention 111. SR-HP4.3 
•  CRITERIA REQUIREMENT: Workers do not surrender their 
identity papers or other original personal documents or pay deposits 
as a condition of employment. SR-HP4.6 
•  CRITERIA REQUIREMENT: Workers have ready access to potable 
water. SR-WC1.2 
•  CRITERIA REQUIREMENT: Where there is insufficient access to 
public education, schoolchildren (of primary school age) of workers 
who live on-site have access to primary educational instruction, 
facilities and materials that meet national requirements. SR-WC2.1 
•  CRITERIA REQUIREMENT: Employer provides personal protective 
equipment to all applicable employees at no cost. (PPE for farms 
include: masks/respirators, goggles, rubber boots, water-proof gloves, 
overalls and ponchos. PPE for mills include: ear plugs.) SR-WC4.1 
•  Authorized minors and pregnant women are prohibited from handling 
or applying agrochemicals OR operating heavy machinery. SR-
WC4.9 (Starbucks Coffee Company, n.d.) 
 
At the moment, compliance rates among Starbucks’ suppliers vary depending 
upon the category – at a minimum about two-thirds – and Starbucks’ stated goal is full 
compliance by 2015.   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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Globalgap is probably the most ambitious private standards initiative related to 
good agricultural practices (GAP). It grew out of a European agribusiness initiative 
which included major retailers. Members now include retailers Ahold, Asda, 
Carrefour, Marks and Spencer, McDonalds, Sainsbury’s, Somerfield and Tesco among 
others, as well as food producers and processors like Carmel, Cargill, Del Monte, 
Lamb Weston and McCain – in total well over 100 major food companies in both 
developed and developing countries. According to Globalgap`s official website, 
The GLOBALGAP standard is primarily designed to reassure consumers 
about how food is produced on the farm by minimising detrimental 
environmental impacts of farming operations, reducing the use of chemical 
inputs and ensuring a responsible approach to worker health and safety as 
well as animal welfare (Globalgap, n.d.), 
A central theme of Globalgap is labour standards. For example, some of the 
compliance criteria are as follows: 
 
•  The living quarters for the workers on farm are habitable, have a 
sound roof, windows and doors, and have the basic services of 
running water, toilets, drains. In case of no drains, septic pits can be 
accepted when proven to be hermetic. AF 3.5.5 
•  Complete sets of protective clothing, (e.g., rubber boots, waterproof 
clothing, protective overalls, rubber gloves, face masks, etc.) which 
enable label instructions and/or legal requirements and/or 
requirements as authorised by a competent authority to be complied 
with are available, used and in a good state of repair. This includes 
appropriate respiratory, ear and eye protection devices and life-
jackets, where necessary. AF 3.4.1 
•  Protective clothing is regularly cleaned, according to a schedule 
adapted to the type of use and degree of soiling. Cleaning the 
protective clothing and equipment includes the separate washing from 
private clothing and glove washing before removal. Dirty, torn and 
damaged protective clothing and equipment and expired filter 
cartridges should be disposed of. Single-use items (e.g., gloves, 
overalls, etc.) have to be disposed of after one use. All the protective 
clothing and equipment including replacement filters etc., are stored 
apart and physically separate from the plant protection products/any 
other chemicals which might cause contamination of the clothing or 
equipment in a well-ventilated area. AF 3.4.2 (Globalgap, 2009) 
   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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Again, the detail in the standards is very high. To ensure compliance, inspections 
are carried out. Private standards have been a double edged sword: they have garnered 
greater and more secure access to developed countries’ markets – enhanced 
international trade – for those who are able to comply but have acted as trade barriers 
for those that cannot. According to Giovannucci (2009), 
With the reduction of traditional trade protection measures such as tariffs 
and quotas, the technical requirements of standards and labelling have 
become more important instruments of commercial policy and trade 
policy. As such, the additional costs and capacity required to meet many 
standards can effectively make them non-tariff barriers and of particular 
concern to developing countries. (p. 9) 
It seems clear that, in the absence of government-to-government initiatives in 
multilateral trade forums to deal with consumer and social advocacy concerns 
regarding labour standards, the private sector has found sufficient incentives to put 
standards in place – standards that have considerable potential to shape international 
trade. The sanctions imposed for not complying with private standards – denial of 
access to international supply chains – are closer to those associated with social 
advocacy than those such as labelling associated with consumers’ right to know. 
The corporate rationale for the imposition of private labour standards, beyond that 
of being a good corporate citizen, is that they are a response to consumer concerns 
(with social activists lumped in with consumers). What has never been seriously 
addressed is whether there is a protectionist motivation, particularly among labour 
unions and farmer organizations, also at work. Further, even if there has been no 
capture of the private standards mechanism by protectionist vested interests, these 
interests may have reaped considerable benefits if the net effect of private standards 
has been trade inhibiting. Such an assessment should be of interest to trade policy 
makers. 
In addition to the success in having labour standards included in private standards, 
consumers, social advocates and protectionist vested interests as a combined group 
have had some success in having labour standards included in preferential trade 
agreements. This is the subject of the next section. 
Labour Standards in Preferential Trade Agreements 
While, at the multilateral level, labour standards issues have remained within the 
purview of the ILO and off of the WTO agenda, this has not been the case with 
preferential trade agreements. The number of preferential trade agreements has been 
expanding rapidly over the last decade, in part because real progress at the Doha 
Round of multilateral negotiations has been so elusive. A second reason, however, was   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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the major shift in U.S. policy from an almost exclusive focus on multilateral 
negotiations
3 to one where both regional/bilateral trade agreements and multilateral 
agreements are pursued (Kerr and Hobbs, 2006). This change has allowed the United 
States to capitalize on its economic power much more effectively in negotiations 
(Kerr, 2005) and allowed the U.S. Congress to insist on a number of its trade concerns 
being put on the preferential trade agreement agendas. Labour standards are one of the 
most often heard congressional concerns in the United States. Pushing for the 
inclusion of provisions relating to labour standards sells well politically in 
congressional districts because it deflects electoral attention away from issues related 
to the productivity of U.S. workers and towards supposedly nefarious practices of 
foreigners. The addition in recent years of the voices of concerned consumers and 
social advocates to the voices of traditional protectionist vested interests has increased 
the effectiveness of the labour standards lobby. 
While the European Union has always followed a policy that pursued preferential 
trade agreements, in recent years labour standards issues have been included on the 
negotiating agenda, although not as explicitly as in the United States. Labour 
standards can be included directly in the agreements or in side agreements. Table 1 
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As can be seen in table 1, all of the U.S. preferential trade agreements since 1994 
and almost all of the recent EU agreements include labour standards provisions. While 
the provisions vary, they are generally based on ILO core standards, although some 
provide exceptions for discrimination based on gender. 
Agreement on a common list of labour standards simply does not exist. The 
definition and specification of core labour standards used by the ILO (basic union 
rights, freedom from forced labour, equal opportunity in employment, and the 
prohibition of child labour) is used in this article. The selection of this definition of 
core labour standards derives from the widespread acceptance and ratification of 
conventions of the ILO related to human rights and labour standards. There are eight 
ILO conventions on core labour standards (two conventions for each of the specified 
core labour standards: union rights, forced labour, child labour and discrimination in 
the labour market). These conventions are also reflected in the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which was adopted in June 1998. 
Although the total number of ratifications varies from one convention to the next, they 
are all in the range of 148–172 countries. All eight conventions have been ratified by 
126 countries, reflecting a relatively widespread agreement on the principles of these 
conventions. 
In developed countries, agricultural labour is sometimes exempted from labour 
standards applied in other sectors (Bruce and Kerr, 1983). The provisions for labour 
standards in the agreements reported in table 1 were examined to see if any special 
provisions were made for agricultural labour. Was agricultural labour specifically 
included in the labour standards provisions? Was agriculture specifically excluded or 
exempted from the labour standards provisions? Was no specific mention made 
regarding agricultural labour? As can be seen in table 1, no special provisions were 
made for agricultural labour in any of the agreements. Agricultural labour was not 
mentioned at all, which implies that the provisions are meant to apply to agricultural 
labour. 
As yet, it does not appear that the labour standards provisions in the preferential 
trade agreements examined in table 1 have formed the basis of a trade action or a 
formal dispute. For most of the agreements, it is however early days. The consistent 
inclusion of labour standards provisions in preferential trade agreements may have 
implications for the WTO. Preferential trade agreements are sometimes seen as 
leading indicators for future directions in the multilateral trade arena. For example, the 
dispute settlement system in the Canada–U.S. Trade Agreement
4 was a model for the 
dispute system devised for the WTO (Apuzzo and Kerr, 1988). Once the Doha Round 
has reached its conclusion – with or without an agreement – a new agenda for   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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negotiations will eventually have to be agreed at the WTO. Given the consistency with 
which labour standards have been incorporated in recent preferential trade agreements 
and the increasing dissatisfaction with the WTO’s treatment of consumer issues in 
general, labour standards may well work their way onto any new multilateral agenda. 
At the moment, however, the member states of the WTO would have a hard time 
including labour standards in any new trade negotiation agenda unless it could be 
shown that low labour standards lead to trade distortions. This question is examined in 
what follows. 
Do Differences in Labour Standard Affect Trade Flows? 
The main objective of this section is to address empirically the question of whether 
developing countries can enhance their comparative advantage (especially in unskilled 
labour–intensive goods) through the use of low labour standards. First the theoretical 
framework is briefly discussed and then the empirical framework as well as the 
estimation results are presented. 
Theoretical Framework 
A standard Heckscher–Ohlin model can be adapted to examine the effect of labour 
standards on trade flows because it is based on different relative factor endowments 
(skilled and unskilled labour) and, hence, changes in endowments can be incorporated 
within its structure. In the simple version of the Heckscher–Ohlin model, it is assumed 
that there are two goods, two factors (skilled, unskilled labour), two countries (home, 
foreign), identical production technologies with constant returns to scale in both 
countries, identical and homogeneous preferences, and no market distortions (Perdikis 
and Kerr, 1998). In addition, it is assumed that the home country has a proportionally 
larger unskilled labour force than the foreign country, and one good (for example 
handbags) is supposed to be unskilled labour–intensive while the other good (for 
example software) is skilled labour–intensive. 
First, consider a situation where the countries trade with each other and both have 
the highest level of labour standards (see figures 1 and 2 in the technical annex – 
appendix A). As the home country has relatively more unskilled labour, it is expected 
that this country will export the unskilled labour–intensive good and import the skilled 
labour–intensive good.  
Now consider a situation where the home country has decided to reduce (or 
reduce enforcement of) labour standards. For example, it might now allow unskilled 
prison labour to be employed – in other words, this particular type of forced labour 
becomes acceptable. As a result, the endowment of unskilled labour in the home 
country will increase, wages will then decrease and the number of employed workers   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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will increase, which can be interpreted as an outward shift in the production 
possibility frontier with a bias toward the unskilled labour–intensive good. As figures 
1 and 2 in appendix A show, declining labour standards (employing prison labour) 
lead to an increase in consumption, trade and welfare levels in both countries. To have 
a comprehensive assessment of the trade effects of core labour standards, the effects 
of other types of core labour standards should also be examined. It is clear that the 
effect of each particular type of labour standard on consumption, trade and welfare 
levels will depend on the impact of the labour standard on the endowment of unskilled 
labour. Use of child labour will also increase the unskilled labour endowment, which, 
in turn, will lead to more consumption and trade. Considering that the share of 
working children aged 10–14 in the employed population in our sample of developing 
countries is, on average, less than 3 percent (it is relatively high, however, for a few 
countries, including Niger – 10.67 percent – and Ethiopia – 10.29 percent), it is 
expected that the trade effect of child labour would not be considerable. 
The effect of discrimination against employment of women on the relative 
endowment of unskilled labour is not unambiguous, depending on the type of 
discrimination. Lower salaries relative to male workers despite similar levels of 
productivity and restrictions on women working in particular sectors of the economy 
are two different examples of employment discrimination against women. Given that 
the educational level of females in developing countries is normally lower than the 
educational level of males, it is expected that discrimination against women will result 
in a lower relative endowment of unskilled labour, at least in the short run. 
Finally, basic union rights such as freedom of association and collective 
bargaining have no clear effects on labour endowments. The net result relies on the 
motives and intentions of unions. The following three scenarios can encompass the 
main motives and intentions of unions. First, unions may play a role in protecting the 
basic rights of workers and ensuring that working conditions are not exploitative. In 
this case, the violation of basic union rights can lead to discrimination, employment of 
child labour or forced labour. Second, unions may cause additional distortions in the 
labour market. If their efforts raise wages above market levels, the number of 
employed workers will decrease. This reduction in the endowment, which is likely 
biased against unskilled labour, in turn will result in lower consumption, trade and 
welfare levels. Third, it is possible that labour union activities lead to increases in 
productivity because workers may be better motivated as a result of improved social 
relationships between workers and employers. This effect can lead to an outward shift 
of PPF, but this shift is not necessarily biased toward unskilled labour–intensive 
goods. Therefore, basic union rights will lead to a rise or fall in the endowment of   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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unskilled labour depending on the relative size of the three effects. Generally 
speaking, the effects of a decline in labour standards vary by type of labour standard. 
To sum up, it is expected that forced and child labour would result in an increase in 
the endowment of unskilled labour (and thus improve comparative advantage in 
unskilled labour-intensive goods), while discrimination against women might lead to a 
decrease in the endowment of unskilled labour, and the effect of basic union rights 
appears ambiguous. Thus, the effect of lower labour standards on trade should be 
separately examined in empirical estimations. 
If lower labour standards can lead to an improvement in comparative advantage, 
in the absence of coordination, each country might lower its own standards in an 
attempt to be more attractive to foreign investment or to gain a comparative advantage 
over foreign exporters – a race to the bottom. 
Empirical Framework   
Previous empirical studies suffer from two major weaknesses. The first problem is 
that some studies, such as the work of Rodrik (1996) and Mah (1997), have employed 
the number of ILO conventions ratified or dummy variables for existence of labour 
standards instead of using measures for labour standards enforcement. The second 
issue is that although studies like Busse (2002) have used some measures for 
enforcement of labour standards, in general, previous empirical models suffer from 
misspecification, as other country characteristics have not been included as 
explanatory variables. In other words, worker rights may influence the trade volume, 
but it is equally possible that omitted economic variables could be central 
determinants of the volume of trade. In what follows, based on the theoretical 
framework, the effect of labour standards on trade is examined, while the problems in 
the previous studies are addressed. 
The supply of unskilled labour–intensive exports (to represent the comparative 
advantage in unskilled labour–intensive goods) can be specified as a function of 
exchange rate, gross domestic product (GDP) and wages. As the exchange rate 
(domestic currency in terms of major currencies) decreases, production for export 
becomes more profitable, and, therefore, exporters will supply more. Carey (1997) 
argues that a country’s capacity to produce should be considered as a determinant of 
export supply. To control for this effect, GDP is included in the model. It is also 
expected that an increase in wages will increase the cost of production and, hence, 
exporters will supply less. Wages, on the other hand, are a function of labour 
endowment and labour standards. 
Since the major goal of this study is to examine the effect of labour standards on 
trade flows, we estimate the model in reduced form. Specifically, in the empirical   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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model the logarithm of unskilled labour–intensive exports in U.S. dollars is 
considered as a function of exchange rate, GDP, labour endowment and core labour 
standards.
5 
The following measures have been chosen to represent core labour standards:6  
 
•  an index ranged from 1 to 5 was used to represent the extent of 
forced labour, the number 1 being assigned when forced labour 
does not exist and 5 when forced labour is used in all forms 
(Busse and Braun, 2003) .This index is based on the following 
definition: forced or compulsory labour is defined as work or 
service exacted under the menace of penalty and for which a 
person has not volunteered (the Forced Labour Convention, 
1930, No. 29, ILO);  
•  the percentage of working children ages 10–14 in the employed 
population is used to represent the prevalence of child labour;  
•  the unemployment rate for women 15 years and older relative to 
the average unemployment rate for males and females is used as 
a proxy for the degree of discrimination against women (World 
Bank, 2005; Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) 
programme, 2007); 
•  a weighted index scaled from 0 to 10 that indicates basic union 
rights such as freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
with 0 denoting the greatest number of violations observed and 
so the worst possible score, and 10 denoting the least number of 
violations observed and so the best possible score. This measure 
is based on 37 evaluation criteria that address unionisation 
problems both in practice and by law (Kucera, 2004);  
•  the number of ILO conventions on core labour standards that 
have been ratified by the country in question. 
 
Our sample includes all developing countries for which comparable data are 
available (48 countries)
7 for 2003.
8 Table A1, in the technical annex – appendix C, 
presents the estimation results for eight different model specifications. However, the 
base model, model 7, is the one in which all economic variables and labour standards 
measures are included as well as regional dummy variables to control for regional-
specific factors.
9 
The results of the base model after addressing the endogeneity problem
10 indicate 
that exports in countries that prohibit forced labour decrease, on average, by 1.66 
percent (0.417*4=1.66). While on theoretical grounds there were no a priori 
expectations regarding the effects of unions, the coefficient is negative, which means 
that the full existence of union rights will lead to a 0.57 percent (in the base model)   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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decrease (0.057*10=0.57) in unskilled labour–intensive exports. The effect of 
discrimination against women on comparative advantage is negative but it is not 
statistically significant. Further, the proportion of children working is neither 
significant nor consistent with a priori expectations in terms of sign. The number of 
ratified conventions is insignificant, with the expected sign. The lack of significance 
for the number of ratified conventions suggests that ratification is a poor measure of 
labour standards; in other words, the ratification of conventions without enforcement 
does not lead to higher labour standards.  
In general, the results suggest that developing countries could potentially improve 
their competitiveness in unskilled labour–intensive goods by lowering some labour 
standards – those relating to forced labour and union rights – although the effect 
would be small. On the other hand, child labour and discrimination against women do 
not appear to affect comparative advantage. 
Conclusions 
This article attempts to investigate the legitimacy of justifications for including labour 
standards in international trade agreements in addition to providing a discussion about 
whether labour standards might be included in trade agreements at the multilateral 
level in the future. In particular, this issue is discussed from producers’ (protectionism 
aspect) and consumers’ (humanitarian aspect) points of view. 
One area in which producers’ requests for protection are consistently heard is the 
area of goods produced using low labour standards. Producers argue that lower or 
poorly enforced labour standards can endow a country with an unfair international 
competitive advantage. The argument is often made that weak labour standards and 
poor enforcement in developing countries cause job losses in developed countries. 
This argument is used to justify high levels of protection in developed countries. 
Given that labour standards also have “human rights” attributes, requests for 
protection by consumer and social advocacy groups can be identified with generally 
accepted humanitarian objectives. In recent years, parties that traditionally have had 
vested interests in having labour standards included as a justification for the 
imposition of trade restrictions have gained powerful allies in the form of consumers 
and social advocates. No matter what the rationale for the imposition of trade barriers, 
however, they will still provide an economic benefit to producers facing competition 
from imports. 
The empirical results of this study suggest that developing countries might 
improve their competitiveness in unskilled labour–intensive goods by lowering some 
labour standards – those relating to forced labour and union rights. Specifically,   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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exports of unskilled labour–intensive goods in countries that prohibit forced labour 
decrease, on average, by 1.66 percent. Full existence of union rights also leads to a 0.6 
percent decrease in exports of unskilled labour–intensive goods. These effects are very 
small, however, and it would be prudent to undertake additional empirical studies 
before any changes are made in the policy of excluding labour standards as a 
justification for the imposition of trade barriers in international trade agreements. 
Although some suggest that the ILO should be considered the main multinational 
organization for oversight of labour standards, it is also argued that the ILO has no 
sanctioning power. As a result, consumer groups, social advocates and traditional 
vested interests such as labour unions in developed countries are trying to find a 
means that will lead eventually to the inclusion of labour standards in WTO 
disciplines. As a first step, these groups have joined forces to push the labour 
standards issue outside the multinational trade organization. For example, the 
relationship between labour standards and international trade has been evolving in the 
areas of private standards and preferential trade agreements. Given the leading role 
that preferential trade agreements can play in determining future directions in 
multilateral trade agreements and the increasing dissatisfaction with the WTO’s 
treatment of consumer issues in general, labour standards may well work their way 
onto any new post-Doha multilateral agenda.   S. Bakhshi and W. Kerr 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1.  The validity of such assertions, however, is open to question. 
2.  The provisions of the ILO agreements are discussed below. 
3.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a politically motivated 
one-off agreement rather than a reflection of a shift in U.S. policy. 
4.  The precursor to the NAFTA. 
5.  Note 1 in the technical annex – appendix B provides the source of data for the 
economic variables. 
6.  Note 2 in the technical annex – appendix B presents more detailed description 
about measures of core labour standards. 
7.  See the list of countries in note 1 in the technical annex – appendix C. 
8.  Since the data for forced labour and union rights are not available for 2003, we 
used available information for 1999. Considering the fact that these variables are 
structural and do not change rapidly, their use is not inappropriate. 
9.  Regional dummy variables are for Latin America–Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Middle East–North Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Non-OECD East Asia–
Pacific. 
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